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Abstract
Simplicial complexes are a versatile and convenient paradigm on which to build
all the tools and techniques of the logic of knowledge, on the assumption that initial
epistemic models can be described in a distributed fashion. Thus, we can define:
knowledge, belief, bisimulation, the group notions of mutual, distributed and common
knowledge, and also dynamics in the shape of simplicial action models. We give a
survey on how to interpret all such notions on simplicial complexes, building upon
the foundations laid in [26].
1 Introduction
Epistemic logic investigates knowledge and belief, and change of knowledge and belief,
in multi-agent systems. Since [36] it has developed into multiple directions. Knowledge
change was extensively modelled in temporal epistemic logics [3, 27, 51] and more recently
in dynamic epistemic logics [64], where action model logic was particularly successful [6].
Modelling asynchrony and concurrency in epistemic logic has been investigated in many
works in a temporal or dynamic setting [17, 27, 29, 37, 48, 50, 51] and more recently in
dynamic epistemic logic [5, 16, 38].
Combinatorial topology has been used to great effect in distributed computing to model
concurrency and asynchrony since the early works [8, 21, 43] that identified one-dimensional
connectivity invariants, and the higher dimensional topological properties discovered in the
early 1990’s e.g. [33, 34]. A recent overview is [32]. The basic structure in combinatorial
topology is the simplicial complex, a collection of subsets of a set of vertices closed under
containment. The subsets, called simplices, can be vertices, edges, triangles, tetrahedrons,
etc.
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Geometric manipulations that preserve some of the topology of an initial simplicial com-
plex, such as subdivision, correspond in a natural and transparent way to the evolution of
a distributed computation by a set of agents. In turn, the topological invariants preserved,
determine the computational power of the distributed computing system (defined by the
possible failures, asynchrony, and communication media).
Recently, an epistemic logic interpreted on simplicial complexes has been proposed [25,
26, 41]. There is a categorical correspondence between the usual Kripke model frames to
interpret epistemic logic and models based on simplicial complexes. The epistemic logic
of [26] is also a dynamic epistemic logic: the action models of [6] correspond to simplicial
complexes in the same way as Kripke models, but then with a dynamic interpretation,
such that action execution is a product operation on simplicial complexes. In this way, [26]
models distributed computing tasks and algorithms in their combinatorial topological in-
carnations as simplicial complexes. As their knowledge operators can be interpreted for
typical asynchronous algorithms (e.g. when processes communicate by writing and read-
ing shared variables), this is a relevant notion of asynchronous knowledge, as it reasons
over indistinguishable asynchronous sequences of events, although differently so than [16].
Predating [26] the work of Porter [52] already established a relation between multi-agent
epistemic models and simplicial complexes by way of the logic of knowledge. In that
work the dynamics were based on the runs-and-systems approach of [27, 20] and not on a
dynamic epistemic logic as in [26].
In this work we further explore and survey what the logic of knowledge can contribute
to the description of simplicial complexes and their dynamic evolution. The goal is to
present an introduction to a variety of issues that arise when using simplicial complexes in
epistemic logic; each one can be studied in more detail, and many problems remain open.
Organization This is an overview of our contribution. Section 2 introduces informally,
and motivates the simplicial complex approach to epistemic logic. Section 3 presents
the logical and topological tools and techniques that we build upon in this work and also
reviews the results of [26]. Section 4 defines bisimulation for simplicial complexes, and gives
the obvious adequacy results for the notion. Section 5 presents a local semantics for the
logic of knowledge on simplicial complexes. In [26] the designated object for interpreting
formulas always is a facet of the simplicial model under consideration. By local semantics
we mean that the designated object can be any simplex. Local semantics therefore allow
us to check the truth even in a vertex of a complex, that represents that local state
of an agent. Section 6 investigates when epistemic models (Kripke models wherein all
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accessibility relations are equivalence relations) can be transformed into local epistemic
models with the same information content. An epistemic model is local if for each variable
there is an agent such that the value of that variable is uniform in any of her equivalence
classes. Section 7 presents semantics on simplicial complexes for the well-known group
epistemic notions of mutual, common, and distributed knowledge. In that section we also
explore novel group epistemic notions describing higher-dimensional features of complexes,
such as truth on a manifold. Section 8 defines belief for simplicial complexes. Unlike
knowledge of propositions, belief of propositions does not entail that these propositions are
true. Beliefs may be false. This is useful to model distributed systems wherein agents may
be mistaken about what other agents know or believe, or even about their own local state.
Section 9 defines simplicial action models. Unlike [26], we define preconditions on vertices
(from which preconditions for facets can be derived, and vice versa) and we also model
factual change (change of the value of variables). As an example of factual change we then
model binary consensus in distributed computing. A short concluding section describes
further avenues for exploration.
2 An informal introduction to epistemic logic on sim-
plicial complexes
Epistemic logic, also known as the logic of knowledge, has been interpreted on a wide variety
of model classes, including Kripke models where all relations are equivalence relations
(a.k.a. epistemic models) [20], rough sets [7], neighbourhood structures [14, 47], subset
space models [15], (not necessarily discrete) topological spaces [49, 46], and the central
topic of this paper, simplicial complexes [26, 41]. Simplicial complexes provide a fascinating
new point of view on epistemic logic. In this section, we give an intuitive explanation of
the notion of simplicial model, its relation with the more traditional epistemic models, and
the new questions that arise from this new simplicial point of view. Precise definitions of
all the concepts discussed here will be given in Section 3.1.
The main object of study in epistemic logic is the modal operator Kaϕ, which stands for
the statement “the agent a knows that the formula ϕ is true”. The usual Kripke semantics
for this operator is based on an epistemic model, which consists of a set S of global states,
and for each agent, an equivalence relation on S called the indistinguishability relation.
By definition, the formula Kaϕ is true in some global state s whenever ϕ is true in every
state t which is indistinguishable from s by the agent a.
In the simplicial complex point of view, each global state is represented by a basic
geometric shape called a simplex. The dimension of these simplices depends on the total
number of agents that we consider: they are edges for 2 agents, triangles for 3 agents,
tetrahedrons for 4 agents, and more generally, n-simplices for n + 1 agents. The notion
of indistinguishability between global states is encoded geometrically by gluing these basic
blocks together. Thus, simplicial models are of a geometric nature. Indeed, in the field of
combinatorial topology, simplicial complexes are the primary representation of a topological
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space, see for example [18, 39].
Epistemic models based on local states Global states are the main elements of
epistemic models, which have served as the basis of the most widely used semantics for
all varieties of modal logic, since the 1960s. However, in many situations, the focus is
on local states. This is for example the case in distributed computing, where the central
role of topology for multi-agent computation was discovered. Here, the agents are parallel
processes that communicate with each other via message-passing or shared memory. The
local state of an agent is defined by its local memory, program counter, etc. Indeed, we
take most of our examples and motivations from this area.
Another motivation for focusing on local states is the relativistic perspective, where at
any given moment an agent’s local state exists and is well-defined but not necessarily so
the (global) state. In fact, there may be more than one state which is compatible with a
set of local states of the agents. Indeed, even talking about absolute real time is impossible
according to relativity theory, so it may not make sense to talk about the state at some
real time t. This relativistic approach has been considered since early on in computer
science [40].
Simplicial models We thus move away from defining an epistemic model in terms of
global states, to one defined in terms of local states. Then, a global state s for n+1 agents
can be decomposed as a tuple (`0, . . . , `n), consisting of one local state for each agent. In a
simplicial model, each of these local states is modeled separately as a vertex of a simplicial
complex. With this point of view, a global state corresponds to a set of n+1 vertices, that
is, an n-dimensional simplex. Two global states are indistinguishable by some agent when
it has the same local state in both of them. In a simplicial model, this fact is represented by
a situation where one vertex (the local state of the agent) belongs to two different simplices
(the two global states).
To give an intuitive understanding of how simplicial complexes are used to model epis-
temic situations, we present a few examples adapted from [26, 32, 41]. In all examples, we
work with either two or three agents in order to be able to draw low-dimensional pictures.
The agents are often represented as colours, gray, white, and black. The local state of an
agent is written inside or besides a vertex of the corresponding colour. Global states are
represented as edges (for 2 agents) or triangles (for 3 agents).
Example 1 For readers familiar with the muddy children puzzle, the picture below rep-
resents the initial knowledge for three children {gray, white, black}, viewed as a simplicial
model. The local view of a child is written as a vector of three symbols among {0, 1,⊥},
where each symbol corresponds to gray, white, and black, in that order. The ‘0’ symbol
means no mud, ‘1’ means muddy, and ‘⊥’ means that the child cannot see her own forehead.
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For instance, the black vertex labeled by 00⊥ corresponds to the local state of the third
child (“black”), which is able to see that the other two children are not muddy. Since she
cannot see her own forehead, this vertex belongs to two possible global states: one where
all children are clean, and one where only the third child is muddy. On the picture, global
states are represented by triangles, and indeed the black vertex labeled by 00⊥ belongs to
two of those triangles. a
Example 2 Each agent gets as input a binary value 0 or 1, but does not know which value
has been received by the other agents. So, every possible combination of 0’s and 1’s is a
possible state. In contrast with the previous example, here each agent knows only its own
value and not the other agents’ values. The figures below depict this situation for 2 and 3
agents, as epistemic models and as simplicial models.
In the epistemic models, the agents are called g, w, b, and the global state is represented
as a vector of values, e.g., 101, representing the values chosen by the agents g, w, b (in that
order). In the 3-agents case, the labels of the dotted edges have been omitted to avoid
overloading the picture, as well as other edges that can be deduced by transitivity.
In the simplicial model, agents are represented as colours (gray, white and black). The
local state is represented as a single value in a vertex, e.g., “1” in a gray vertex means
that agent g has been given input value 1. The global states correspond to edges in the
2-agents case, and triangles in the 3-agents case.
01 0 1
00 11
10 0 1
g
w g
w
111
110011
010
101
100001
000
gwwb
gw wb
gb wb
gb
gw
gb
Notice that the simplicial complex on the right is an octahedron, that is, a triangulated
sphere. More generally, it is known that the binary input simplicial complex for n + 1
agents is an n-dimensional sphere [32]. a
Example 3 The toy example below illustrates the equivalence between epistemic models
and simplicial models. The picture shows an epistemic model (left) and its associated
simplicial model (right). No variable labelings are shown. The three agents, named g, w, b,
are represented as colours gray, white and black on the vertices of the simplicial complex.
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The three global states of the epistemic model correspond to the three triangles (i.e., 2-
dimensional facets) of the simplicial complex. The two states indistinguishable by agent b,
are glued along their black vertex; while the two states indistinguishable by agents g and
w are glued along the gray-and-white edge. The two functors κ and σ translating back
and forth between the two kinds of models are defined formally in Section 3.3.
g, w b
κ
σ a
Example 4 (Asynchronous computation and subdivisions) We now give an exam-
ple that illustrates how a simplicial model can change after communication. In Section 9
we explore change of information using action models. We describe here an important
geometric operation on simplicial complexes called the chromatic subdivision. We describe
it for 3 agents, but it generalizes to any number of agents. It appears in various dis-
tributed computing situations, where agents communicate by shared memory or message
passing [32].
Consider three agents, represented with colours black, gray, white, and suppose that
the black agent may receive as input value either 0 or 1, while the two other agents receive
input 0. The two triangles on the left represent two facets of the input model, with input
values 000 (green) and 100 (yellow). Now, suppose they communicate to each other their
inputs, but in the following unreliable way. After communication, it is possible that an
agent missed hearing the input value of one or two of the other agents. There are 4 possible
patterns of communication, x, y, z, w, illustrated in the figure. Each pattern is defined by
a table, with one row per agent. An agent x receives the value from agent y if and only
if they are both on the same row, or x is in a row below that of y. After communication,
we have the simplicial model on the right. Each vertex is labeled with a vector indicating
which values it received.
The triangle x represents the situation where all agents heard their inputs (all 0 in this
case) from each other, and intersects in an edge with the triangle y, where the black agent
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did not hear from the other two. Triangle x intersects only in a vertex with triangle w,
where both the gray and the black heard from each other, but not from white. Triangle x
also intersects in only one vertex with triangle z, where the black heard from no-one, gray
heard only from black, and white heard from everybody. a
Example 5 (Synchronous computation) Consider again black, white, and gray agents.
They get inputs 012, respectively. Suppose they communicate to each other their inputs
in a reliable way, but now, at most one of the agents may crash. Thus, when they commu-
nicate, it is possible that an agent missed hearing the input value of another agent, and in
that case, it knows that this agent crashed. After communication, we have the simplicial
model below. The center triangle represents the state where no one crashed, and each
agent learned the inputs of every agent. The other edges represent the cases where one
agent crashed, and that is why the dimension goes down. Thus, such global states are
represented as edges instead of triangles. The local state of the crashed agent is no longer
relevant.
This is an example of synchronous computation, which has been thoroughly studied in
distributed computing, see e.g. [32, chapter 13.5.2]. a
The correspondence between epistemic models and simplicial models exhibited in [26]
(and depicted in Example 3) can be extended to model various epistemic notions. We con-
clude this motivating section with an overview of novel ways presented in this contribution
in which epistemic logic can be relevant to describe simplicial complexes, with pointers to
further sections giving details.
• Locality. A crucial property that allows one to translate an epistemic model into
a simplicial one is called locality (see Section 3.1). Intuitively, an epistemic model
is local when each propositional variable talks only about the local state of one of
the agents. This condition can be lifted in the case of finite epistemic models as
demonstrated in [41]. In Section 6 we investigate the consequences of this solution
for the information content of models, and what happens in the infinite case.
• Dynamics. A simplicial complex version of the action models found in dynamic
epistemic logic was defined in [26]. In Section 9, we build on this idea in order to
include the notion of factual change, which allows the values of propositional variables
to be modified by the action model.
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• Bisimulation. A central topic in modal logics is that of bisimulation between epis-
temic models. Bisimulation of simplicial models has been proposed in [24, 41]. We
further discuss simplicial bisimulation in Section 4, and relate it with simplicial maps
and covering spaces.
• Maps. In topology maps from one space to another are continuous functions, which
in the case of simplicial complexes are simplicial maps. The simulations and bisim-
ulations introduced in Section 4 are natural generalizations of simplicial maps, on
condition that they are also value preserving. Then, in Section 8 we model the no-
tion of belief (knowledge that may be incorrect) on simplicial complexes, by way of
so-called belief functions that induce simplicial maps in an obvious way, however in
that case they need not be value preserving, as beliefs may be incorrect.
• Topology. The most evident new feature of simplicial models is their geometric
nature. Hence, one can analyze the topological structure of the underlying space,
such as its high-dimensional connectivity (e.g. homotopy groups, representing its
“holes”). Examples 1 and 2 make the geometric space evident that would be hard to
see in an epistemic model.
The basic knowledge operator Kaϕ is intrinsically one-dimensional. However, higher
dimensional structure in complexes can be described by, for example, group epistemic
operators, such as the common distributed knowledge presented in Section 7 that can
check truth on manifolds.
• Local semantics. In epistemic models the typical unit of interpretation is the
(global) state, as in the semantics of epistemic logic on simplicial complexes presented
in [26, 41]. However, there are far more relevant units of interpretation on simplicial
complexes, as we should not be constrained to determine truth in facets only but
should want to determine truth in simplices of any dimension. Already in Example 3,
we see that there are 3 states, corresponding to three facets, while the total number
of simplices is 17. Local interpretation on simplices is addressed in Section 5.
• Hierarchical structure. In distributed computing simplicial models often have a
hierarchical structure, meaning that they are composed of submodels representing the
behavior of systems with less agents, and hence of lower dimension. In Example 4,
notice that the simplicial model on the right is a subdivision of the initial simplicial
model, and furthermore, the green sub-complex is a subdivision of the initial green
triangle, while the yellow sub-complex is a subdivision of the initial yellow triangle.
Notice that whenever the white and gray agents do not hear from the black one,
they cannot tell what its input was. Thus, the intersection C ′ of both the green and
the yellow complexes consists of three edges (and their vertices). This complex C ′
is a subdivision of the initial edge, which is the intersection of the green and the
yellow triangle. Hence, we can analyze a subcomplex C ′ of C, of dimension 1, with
an interesting semantic meaning: it represents a subsystem consisting of only two
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agents, white and gray. One can ask what the white and gray agents know on vertices
or edges of C ′, as if the larger system of three agents did not exist.
This sort of semantics for edges instead of triangles is addressed in full generality in
Section 6.1, as language-restricted local semantics.
• Variable number of agents. In distributed computing, whenever crashes are de-
tectable, facets of different size may occur (see Example 5). In epistemic logic such
phenomena are modelled in logics of awareness and knowledge, and in particular the
kind of unawareness known as unawareness of propositional variables, as in [19, 61].
A thorough treatment of this topic is deferred to future research. Another direc-
tion for future investigation are adjunctions between epistemic frames and simplicial
complexes, that generalize the (equivalent) correspondence between frames and com-
plexes of [26].
For the sake of completeness, we also mention below some of the important features of
simplicial models, even though we do not address them in the rest of the paper. They
are not specific to the epistemic logic perspective, and have been thoroughly studied in
distributed computing. See [32] for more detail.
• Topological invariants. As it turns out, there are topological invariants that are
maintained starting from an initial simplicial model, after the agents communicate
with each other. In the most basic case, illustrated in Example 4, the initial simplical
model is subdivided, but in other situations where the communication is more reliable
“holes” may be introduced, as in Example 5. Many other examples are described
in [32], and the notion of “holes” is formalized in terms of homotopy groups.
• Power of a computational model. The topological invariants preserved by the
distributed model (number of failures, communication media, etc) in turn determine
what the agents can distributively compute. After all, whatever computation an
agent is performing, the outcome is a function of its local state. Thus, decisions
induce a simplicial map from the simplicial complex representing what the agents
know about the inputs after communication, to an output simplicial complex model
representing what they are expected to compute based on that knowledge. This
approach is developed in [26].
• Specifications. In [26] it is explained how a simplicial model is used as knowledge
that is supposed to be gained by a set of agents communicating with each other, via
a simplicial map from the simplicial model at the end of the agent’s communications.
3 Logical and topological tools
3.1 Logical tools
Given are a set A of n+ 1 agents a0, . . . , an (or a, b, . . . ) and a countable set P of (global)
variables (or variables) p, q, p′, q′, . . . (possibly indexed).
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Language The language of epistemic logic LK(A,P ) is defined as
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Kaϕ
where p ∈ P and a ∈ A. We will write LK(P ) if A is clear from the context, and LK if
A and P are clear from the context. For ¬p we may write p. Expression Kaϕ stands for
‘agent a knows (that) ϕ.’ The fragment without inductive construct Kaϕ is the language
of propositional logic (also known as the Booleans) denoted L∅(A,P ). For ¬Ka¬ϕ we may
write K̂aϕ, for ‘agent a considers it possible that ϕ.’
Epistemic models Epistemic frames are pairs M = (S,∼) where S is the domain
of (global) states, and ∼ is a function from the set of agents A to (binary) accessibility
relations on S, that are required to be equivalence relations. For ∼ (a) we write ∼a.
Epistemic models are triplesM = (S,∼, L), where (S,∼) is an epistemic frame and where
valuation L is a function from S to P(P ). A pair (M, s) where s ∈ S is a pointed epistemic
model. We also distinguish the multi-pointed epistemic model (M, S ′) where S ′ ⊆ S. For
(s, t) ∈ ∼a we write s ∼a t, and for {t | s ∼a t} we write [s]a: this is an equivalence class
of the relation ∼a.
We now introduce terminology for epistemic models for distributed systems.
Given an epistemic modelM = (S,∼, L), a variable p ∈ P is local for agent a ∈ A iff for
all s, t ∈ S, if s ∼a t then p ∈ L(s) iff p ∈ L(t). Variable p is local iff it is local for some agent
a, and a modelM is local iff all variables are local. We write Pa for the set of local variables
for agent a, i.e., Pa = {p ∈ P | for all s, t ∈ S, if s ∼a t, then p ∈ L(s) iff p ∈ L(t)}. If
an epistemic model is local, then
⋃
Pa = P . Without loss of generality we may assume
that all members of {Pa0 , . . . , Pan} are mutually disjoint, and that members of each Pa are
subindexed with the agent name as in: pa, p
′
a, qa, . . .
We can also approach locality from the other direction. Let mutually disjoint sets
Sa0 . . . San of local states and mutually disjoint sets Pa0 , . . . , Pan of local variables (for resp.
agents a0, . . . , an) be given. Let for each a ∈ A, La : Sa → P(Pa) be a valuation for the
local states of agent a. A distributed model is an epistemic model (S,∼, L) such that:
• S ⊆ Sa0 × · · · × San ;
• for all a ∈ A and s, t ∈ S: s ∼a t iff sa = ta;
• for all a ∈ A and s ∈ S: L(s) = {p ∈ P | ∃a ∈ A : p ∈ La(sa)}.
In other words, each global state s ∈ S is an (n + 1)-tuple s = (s0, . . . , sn) of local states
for the agents 0, . . . , n respectively.
An epistemic frame (S,∼) is proper if ∩a∈A ∼a= Id, where the identity relation Id :=
{(s, s) | s ∈ S}. An epistemic model is proper if its underlying frame is proper.
Clearly, a distributed model is local proper epistemic model, and we can also see a local
proper epistemic model as a distributed model: ifM = (S,∼, L) is proper, then the model
wherein domain S is replaced by the domain {([s]a0 , . . . , [s]an) | s ∈ S} (and wherein the
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valuation can be relativized to a in the obvious way) is a distributed model. The definition
is adequate, as for all s ∈ S it holds that [s]a0 ∩ . . . ∩ [s]an = {s}.
An epistemic model is factual if all global states have different valuations, i.e., if for all
s, t ∈ S there is a p ∈ P such that p ∈ L(s) and p /∈ L(t), or p /∈ L(s) and p ∈ L(t).
Semantics on epistemic models The interpretation of a formula ϕ ∈ LK in a global
state of a given pointed model (M, s) is by induction on the structure of ϕ. The expression
“M, s |= ϕ” stands for “in global state s of epistemic model M it holds that ϕ.”
M, s |= p iff p ∈ L(s)
M, s |= ¬ϕ iff M, s 6|= ϕ
M, s |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, s |= ϕ and M, s |= ψ
M, s |= Kaϕ iff M, t |= ϕ for all t with s ∼a t
Formula ϕ is valid iff for all (M, s), M, s |= ϕ. Given (M, s) and (M′, s′), by (M, s) ≡
(M′, s′), for “(M, s) and (M′, s′) are modally equivalent,” we mean that for all ϕ ∈ LK :
M, s |= ϕ iff M′, s′ |= ϕ. Informally, this means that these pointed models contain the
same information. We let [[ϕ]]M stand for {s ∈ S | M, s |= ϕ}. This set is called the
denotation of ϕ in M.
Standard references for epistemic logic are [44, 20, 62]. The typical example of proper
factual local epistemic models are interpreted systems [20].
3.2 Topological tools
We continue by introducing simplicial complexes and other topological tools. A reference
on algebraic topology is [30], on a more combinatorial approach there are [18, 39], and on
the use of combinatorial topology in distributed computing it is [32]. Subsequently and in
the next subsection we review results from [26], that are also reported in [41].
Simplicial complexes Given a set of vertices V (sometimes also called local states;
singular form vertex), a (simplicial) complex C is a set of non-empty finite subsets of V ,
called simplices (singular form simplex), that is closed under subsets (such that for all
X ∈ C, Y ⊆ X implies Y ∈ C), and that contains all singleton subsets of V . If Y ⊆ X we
say that Y is a face of X. A maximal simplex in C is a facet. The facets of a complex C
are denoted as F(C), and the vertices of a complex C are denoted as V(C). The dimension
of a simplex X is |X| − 1, e.g., vertices are of dimension 0, while edges are of dimension 1.
The dimension of a complex is the maximal dimension of its facets. A simplicial complex
is pure if all facets have the same dimension. A manifold is a pure simplicial complex C
of dimension n such that: (i) for any X, Y ∈ F(C) there are facets X = X0, . . . , Xm = Y
such that for all i < m the dimension of Xi ∩Xi+i is n − 1 (this is a ‘path’ from X to Y
in C), and (ii) any simplex Z ∈ C of dimension n − 1 is a face of one or two facets of C
(those that are faces of only one facet form the boundary of C).
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Complex D is a subcomplex of complex C if D ⊆ C. A subcomplex of interest is the
m-skeleton D of a pure n-dimensional complex C, i.e, the maximal subcomplex D of C of
dimension m.
We decorate the vertices of simplicial complexes with agent’s names, that we refer to
as colours. A chromatic map from the vertices of C to A assigning colours to vertices is
denoted χ. Thus, χ(v) ∈ A denotes that the local state v belongs to agent a. Different
vertices of the same simplex should be assigned different colours. The vertex of a simplex
X coloured with a is denoted Xa. A pair consisting of a simplicial complex and a colouring
map χ is a chromatic simplicial complex.
From now on, all simplicial complexes will be chromatic pure simplicial complexes.
Simplicial models We now also decorate the vertices of simplicial complexes with local
variables pa ∈ Pa for a ∈ A, where we recall that
⋃
a∈A Pa = P (all sets of local variables are
assumed to be disjoint). While chromatic maps are denoted χ, χ′, . . . , valuations (valuation
maps) assigning sets of local variables to vertices are denoted `, `′, . . . For any X ∈ C,
`(X) stands for
⋃
v∈X `(v). A simplicial model C is a triple (C, χ, `) where C is a simplicial
complex.
Simplicial maps Given simplicial complexes C and C ′, a simplicial map (simplicial
function) is a function f : V(C)→ V(C ′) that preserves simplices (such that for all X ∈ C,
f(X) := {f(v) | v ∈ X} ∈ C ′). We also let f(C) := {f(X) | X ∈ C}. A simplicial
map is rigid if it is dimension preserving (if for all X ∈ C, |f(X)| = |X|). A chromatic
simplicial map is a colour preserving simplicial map, where colour preserving means that
for all v ∈ V(C), χ(f(v)) = χ(v). We note that it is therefore also rigid.
Let now C = (C, χ, `) and C ′ = (C ′, χ′, `′) be simplicial models. A chromatic simplicial
map f between the complexes C and C ′ is also called a simplicial map between the models
C and C ′. The simplicial map f is value preserving if for all v ∈ V(C), `(f(v)) = `(v). If f is
not only colour preserving but also value preserving, and its inverse f−1 as well, then C and
C ′ are isomorphic, notation C ' C ′. It is customary to define isomorphy between simplicial
complexes instead of between simplicial models. However, we will later define a bisimulation
as a relation between simplicial models, such that isomorphy implies bisimilarity but not
necessarily vice versa. We therefore defined isomorphy between simplicial models.
3.3 Epistemic logic on simplicial models
Semantics on simplicial models The interpretation of a formula ϕ ∈ LK(A,P ) in a
facet X ∈ F(C) of a given simplicial model C = (C, χ, `) is by induction on the structure
of ϕ. Merely the clause for knowledge looks different than that on epistemic models.
C, X |= pa iff pa ∈ `(X)
C, X |= ¬ϕ iff C, X 6|= ϕ
C, X |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff C, X |= ϕ and C, X |= ψ
C, X |= Kaϕ iff C, Y |= ϕ for all Y ∈ F(C) with a ∈ χ(X ∩ Y )
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Validity and modal equivalence are also defined similarly. Formula ϕ is valid iff for all
(C, X), C, X |= ϕ; and given (C, X) and (C ′, X ′), by (C, X) ≡ (C ′, X ′) we mean that for all
ϕ ∈ LK(A,P ): C, X |= ϕ iff C ′, X ′ |= ϕ.
Correspondence between simplicial models and epistemic models Given agents
A and variables P , let K be the class of local proper epistemic models and let S be the class
of simplicial models. In [26], simplicial models are shown to correspond to local proper
epistemic models by showing that the underlying proper epistemic frames and simplicial
complexes correspond (categorically) via functions (functors) σ : K → S (σ for S implicial)
and κ : S → K (κ for K ripke), and then extending σ and κ in the obvious way, such
that they are also valuation preserving, to models. The correspondence uses the observed
relation between local proper epistemic models and distributed models. These are the
details.
Given a local proper epistemic model M = (S,∼, L), we define σ(M) = (C, χ, `) as
follows. Its vertices are V(σ(M)) = {[s]a | a ∈ A, s ∈ S}, where χ([s]a) = a. Its facets are
F(σ(M)) = {{[s]a0 , . . . , [s]an} | s ∈ S}. For such a facet {[s]a0 , . . . , [s]an} we write σ(s).
Then, [s]a ∈ σ(s)∩σ(t) iff s ∼a t (i.e., such that [s]a = [t]a), and for all pa ∈ P , pa ∈ `([s]a)
iff pa ∈ L(s). We note that σ(M) has dimension n.
Given a simplicial model C = (C, χ, `), we define an epistemic κ(M) = (S,∼, L) as
follows. Its domain S consists of states κ(X) for all X ∈ F(C). We define κ(X) ∼a κ(Y )
iff a ∈ X ∩ Y , and pa ∈ L(κ(X)) iff pa ∈ `(X). We note that κ(M) is local and proper.
One can now show that:
Proposition 6 ([26]) For all M∈ K, κ(σ(M)) 'M, and for all C ∈ S, σ(κ(C)) ' C. a
Proposition 7 ([26]) For all ϕ ∈ LK , M, s |= ϕ iff σ(M), σ(s) |= ϕ, and C, X |= ϕ iff
κ(C), κ(X) |= ϕ. a
4 Bisimulation for simplicial complexes
If two models are isomorphic, they make the same formulas true, i.e., they contain the
same information (what we also called modally equivalent). In modal logic and concurrency
theory, a weaker form of sameness than isomorphy already guarantees that, bisimilarity
[4, 10, 55, 57, 66]. As truth is invariant under bisimulation, it is an important way to
determine whether structures contain the same information. In distributed computing by
way of combinatorial topology, bisimulation between simplicial models has been proposed
in [25, 41]. We present and further explore this notion, and demonstrate its adequacy
with respect to bisimulation for epistemic models. This may be considered of interest, for
example, if different subdivisions of complexes are shown to be bisimilar, then they contain
the same information after all.
We first define the standard notion of bisimulation between epistemic models, and then
bisimulation between simplicial models.
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Bisimulation between epistemic models A bisimulation betweenM = (S,∼, L) and
M′ = (S ′,∼′, L′), notation R :M↔M′, is a non-empty relation R ⊆ S×S ′ such that for
all s ∈ S, s′ ∈ S ′ with Rss′ the following three conditions are satisfied:
• atoms: for all p ∈ P , p ∈ L(s) iff p ∈ L′(s′).
• forth: for all a ∈ A, for all t with s ∼a t, there is a t′ with s′ ∼′a t′ such that Rtt′.
• back: for all a ∈ A, for all t′ with s′ ∼′a t′, there is a t with s ∼a t such that Rtt′.
A bisimulation R such that for all s ∈ S there is a s′ ∈ S ′ such that Rss′ and for all s′ ∈ S ′
there is a s ∈ S such that Rss′ is a total bisimulation. If there is a bisimulation R between
M and M′ we say that M and M′ are bisimilar, denoted M↔M′. A bisimulation
between pointed models (M, s) and (M′, s′) is a bisimulation R such that Rss′, notation
R : (M, s)↔(M′, s′), and if there is such a bisimulation we write (M, s)↔(M′, s′). A
model is bisimulation minimal if the only total bisimulation on that model (i.e., between
the model and itself) is the identity relation.
Bisimulation between simplicial models Let be given simplicial models C = (C, χ, `)
and C ′ = (C ′, χ′, `′). A non-empty relation R between F(C) and F(C ′) is a (simplicial)
bisimulation between C and C ′, notation R : C↔C ′, iff for all Y ∈ F(C) and Y ′ ∈ F(C ′)
with RY Y ′ the following three conditions are satisfied:
• atoms: for all a ∈ A and pa ∈ Pa, pa ∈ `(Y ) iff pa ∈ `(Y ′).
• forth: for all a ∈ A, if Z ∈ F(C) and a ∈ χ(Y ∩ Z) there is a Z ′ ∈ F(C ′) with
a ∈ χ(Y ′ ∩ Z ′) such that RZZ ′.
• back: for all a ∈ A, if Z ′ ∈ F(C ′) and a ∈ χ(Y ′ ∩ Z ′) there is a Z ∈ F(C) with
a ∈ χ(Y ∩ Z) such that RZZ ′.
A total simplicial bisimulation R is a simplicial bisimulation such that for all X ∈ F(C)
there is a X ′ ∈ V(C ′) with RXX ′ and for all X ′ ∈ F(C ′) there is a X ∈ F(C) with RXX ′.
If there is a bisimulation between C and C ′ we write C↔C ′. A bisimulation between pointed
simplicial models (C, X) and (C ′, X ′), where X ∈ F(C) and X ′ ∈ F(C ′), is a bisimulation
R such that RXX ′, notation R : (C, X)↔(C ′, X ′), and if there is such a bisimulation we
write (C, X)↔(C ′, X ′). Relation R is a simulation if it satisfies the atoms and the forth
conditions.
Intuitively, the forth-clause preserves ignorance when going from C to C ′, and the
back-clause preserves knowledge when going from C to C ′.
A relation R : F(C) → F(C ′) between facets induces a (similarly denoted) colour
preserving relation R : V(C) → V(C ′) between vertices by way of: if RXX ′ then for all
a ∈ A, RXaX ′a. Dually, given a relation R : V(C) → V(C ′) between vertices that is
chromatic, i.e., colour preserving (if Rvv′ then χ(v) = χ(v′)), then for any simplices X,X ′
with χ(X) = χ(X ′), RXX ′ denotes that for all a ∈ χ(X), RXaX ′a.
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As bisimulations between simplicial models are relations between facets, and as facets
correspond to global states in epistemic models, such bisimulations are very much like
bisimulations between epistemic models.
The reader may wonder why bisimulations between simplicial models are not defined
between vertices instead of between facets, and with the back and forth conditions only
required between vertices. This is undesirable, because if we were to do so, then different
simplicial models with the same 1-dimensional skeleton could incorrectly become bisimilar.
Example 9 illustrates how this can go wrong. Similar counterexamples can easily be found if
we merely require back and forth for simplices of dimension m smaller than the dimension
n of the complex. This demonstrates that back and forth need to be required for facets.
More interestingly, now suppose bisimulations between simplicial models were defined
as relations between vertices but with the back and forth conditions between facets.
This is also undesirable: although a relation between facets induces a (unique) relation
between vertices, different relations between facets may induce the same relation between
vertices. Therefore, only specifying the relation between vertices does not determine a
relation between facets. However, there is a unique maximal such relation, defined as: for
all facets X and X ′, RXX ′ iff for all a ∈ A, RXaX ′a. Example 10 illustrates this.
Given a bisimulation, its induced chromatic relation between vertices interestingly com-
pares to chromatic simplicial maps. We recall the notion of chromatic simplicial map
as a colour and simplex preserving function between the vertices of a complex. Given
C = (C, χ, `) and C ′ = (C ′, χ′, `′), we will call a relation R between vertices simplex
preserving if for all X ∈ C with X in the domain of R there is a X ′ ∈ C ′ such that
RXX ′. It is easy to see that a bisimulation R between simplicial models induces a re-
lation R between vertices that is simplex preserving and such that its converse relation
R−1 := {(v′, v) | (v, v′) ∈ R} is also simplex preserving:
Let X ∈ C be such that X is in the domain ofR, then, as C is pure, there is a Y ∈ F(C)
with X ⊆ Y . Let now v ∈ X. As v is in the domain of R, there is a Z ∈ F(C) with v ∈ Z
and a Z ′ ∈ F(C ′) such that RZZ ′. As v ∈ Z and v ∈ Y , v ∈ Z ∩ Y . Let now χ(v) = a,
then from RZZ ′, v ∈ Z ∩ Y and forth it follows that there is a Y ′ such that RY Y ′. The
set X ′ ⊆ V(C ′) with RXX ′ is therefore a face of Y ′ and thus a simplex. Similarly, using
that back is satisfied for R we show that R−1 is simplex preserving. It seems interesting to
explore how a bisimulation can be seen as a generalization of a chromatic simplicial map.
Note that the atoms requirement corresponds to the value preservation of the simplicial
map. In Propositions 13 and 14, later, we also address the relation between bisimulations
(and simulations) and simplicial maps.
Example 8 The two simplicial models on the left are (totally) bisimilar: all four facets
on the far left are related to the single facet on the near left. The two simplicial models on
the right are also (totally) bisimilar: the two opposed {a0, b0, c0} facets on the near right
are related to the facet {a0, b0, c0} of the complex on the far right, and the {a1, b0, c0}
facet on the near right is related to the facet {a1, b0, c0} on the far right.
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a0 b0
c0
a0b0
c0
↔ b0 a0
c0
c0
a0 b0
b0
a1b0
c0 ↔ a0 b0
b0
a1b0
c0
a
Example 9 It is not sufficient only to require forth and back for lower dimensional
simplices, e.g., for edges only. For a counterexample, consider the following simplicial
models C and C ′ (and with valuations as depicted). Simplicial model C consists of four
facets/triangles, whereas simplicial model C ′ consists of three facets (the middle triangle
{a1, b1, c1} is not a facet). The 1-skeletons of C and C ′ (checking forth and back only for
edges of triangles) are bisimilar by way of the relation R mapping vertices with the same
colour and value. However, C and C ′ are not bisimilar, because no facet of C ′ is bisimilar
to F4 in C.
C : a0 b0
c0
a1b1
c1
F1
F2
F3
F4
C ′ : a0 b0
c0
a1b1
c1
F1
F2
F3

a
Example 10 Consider three one-dimensional complexes C = (C, χ, `), C ′ = (C ′, χ′, `′),
and C ′′ = (C ′′, χ′′, `′′) for two agents a, b, where we assume that a has the same value
everywhere, and that b also has the same value everywhere.
C :
a b
ab
Z
Y
X
W
C ′ :
a b
a
ba
b
Y ′
X′
W ′
V ′
U ′
Z′
C ′′ :
a b
X′′
Clearly, they are all bisimilar. Two different bisimulations between C and C ′ are:
R := {(X, V ′), (X,X ′), (X,Z ′), (Y, U ′), (Y,W ′), (Y, Y ′),
(Z, V ′), (Z,X ′), (Z,Z ′), (W,U ′), (W,W ′), (W,Y ′)}
R′ := F(C)×F(C ′)
Relations R and R′ induce the same relation between vertices, namely relating every a
vertex in C to every a vertex in C ′, and every b vertex in C to every b vertex in C ′. This
demonstrates that the same relation between vertices may be consistent with different
relations between facets. The relation R′ is the maximal bisimulation between C and C ′.
Assuming the relation by vertices as primitive, we can define also define R′ as: for all facets
X and X ′, R′XX ′ iff (R′XaX ′a and R
′XbX ′b).
Both C and C ′ are bisimilar to the single-edged complex C ′′. This complex is bisimulation
minimal (C ′′ can be seen as the quotient of C, and of C ′, with respect to bisimilarity). a
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Subdivision Subdivisions typically do not result in bisimilar complexes. Consider the
two simplicial models for agents a, b below, where the edge with labels 1 is subdivided into
three edges, while the other two edges of this simplicial model are not subdivided. These
two simplicial models are not bisimilar. Clearly, because of atoms, the facet a1——b1 on
the left must be in relation with a facet a1——b1 on the right. Which one? If we choose
a1——b1 on the right, then forth fails because the adjoining b1——a2 on the left cannot
be related to b1——a1 on the right, as the values of the a vertices are different. If we choose
b1——a1 on the right, then forth fails because the adjoining b0——a1 on the left cannot
be related to a1——b1 on the right, as the values of the b vertices are different. Finally
and again similarly, if we choose a1——b1 on the right, then back fails, as b0——a1 and
b1——a1 are not related.
We can also come to this conclusion in a different way: if the respective complexes have
different properties of knowledge, then they are not bisimilar (Proposition 12, later). We
now note, for example, that in the complex on the right in vertex b1 agent b knows that
the value of a is 1, whereas on the left agent b is uncertain about the value of a if his value
is 1. Similarly, a1 on the right is the unique vertex where a knows that the value of b is 1.
b0 a1 b1 a2 6↔ b0 a1 b1 a1 b1 a2
However, sometimes subdivisions result in bisimilar complexes. For example, if, instead,
a1——b1 were the unique edge of a simplicial model, then its subdivision must be bisimilar,
as below:
a1 b1 ↔ a1 b1 a1 b1
Similarly, for dimension 2, the left complex below consists of a single facet, and it is
bisimilar to its subdivision on the right (by connecting vertices with the same colour),
where we assume that all vertices of the same colour satisfy the same local variable(s).
a b
c
↔
a b a b
c
b a
c
c
a b
c
Bisimulation may be a useful tool to determine whether seemingly similar simplicial com-
plexes contain the same information. As well known, this can be determined in quadratic
time with respect to the size of the models (i.e., complexes). Another use may be to de-
termine whether, given some initial complex, clearly different subdivisions (where agents
have different knowledge, such as a knows p in one but never in the other, and b knows q
in the other but never in the one) both have subsequent subdivisions resulting, after all,
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in bisimilar complexes again. This is the property known as confluence, or Church-Rosser.
Isomorphy is then often a bridge too far, but bisimilarity may be all we need.
We close this section with some elementary results for bisimulations between complexes.
We recall the maps κ : S → K and σ : K → S between the simplicial models and the
proper local epistemic models. We now have the following.
Proposition 11 Let M,M′ ∈ K, let C, C ′ ∈ S. Then:
• If M↔M′, then σ(M)↔σ(M′).
• If C↔C ′, then κ(C)↔κ(C ′).
• If M↔M′, then κ(σ(M))↔κ(σ(M′)).
• If C↔C ′, then σ(κ(C))↔σ(κ(C ′)). a
Proof We show the first item. Let M = (S,∼, L) and M′ = (S ′,∼′, L′) be local proper
epistemic models.
Let R : M↔M′. We define relation R′ beween the facets σ(s) = {[s]a | a ∈ A} of
σ(M) and the facets σ(s′) = {[s′]a | a ∈ A} of σ(M′) as: R′σ(s)σ(s′) iff Rss′. Note that
this induces that for all a ∈ A, R′[s]a[s′]a iff Rss′.
We now show that R′ is a bisimulation. Let R′σ(s)σ(s′).
The clause atoms holds: For all [s]a ∈ σ(s), [s′]a ∈ σ(s′) and pa ∈ P , we have that
pa ∈ `([s]a) iff pa ∈ L(s) iff (using atoms for R, given that Rss′ follows from R′σ(s)σ(s′))
pa ∈ L′(s′) iff pa ∈ `([s]a).
The clause forth holds: Let σ(t) ∈ F(σ(M)) such that a ∈ χ(σ(s) ∩ σ(t)). From the
definition of σ(M) we get that s ∼a t. Therefore, given R′σ(s)σ(s′) and therefore Rss′,
and as R is a bisimulation, there is t′ ∈ M′ such that s′ ∼a t′ and Rtt′. We now choose
σ(t′) ∈ F(σ(M′)) to obtain R′σ(t)σ(t′) and a ∈ χ(σ(s′) ∩ σ(t′)), as required.
The back step is similar.
The proof of the second item is also fairly similar.
The last two items follow from the first two items, but also directly fromM' κ(σ(M))
and C ' σ(κ(M)): isomorphy is stronger than bisimilarity, and bisimilarity is transitive.

These results extend the known results that κ(σ(M)) 'M and that σ(κ(C)) ' C from [26]
(Prop. 6) in the expected way. Clearly, we also have such correspondence between pointed
simplicial complexes, for example, σ(κ(C, X))↔σ(κ(C ′, X ′)), where X is a facet in the
complex of C and X ′ is a facet in the complex of C ′.
Also for simplicial complexes, bisimilarity implies modal equivalence, and for finite
complexes the implication also holds in the other direction, as is to be expected. It is often
assumed in combinatorial topology and in distributed computing that complexes are finite,
but not always. Interesting applications exist for the infinite case [2].
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Proposition 12 Let (C, X) and (C ′, X ′) be given, with C = (C, χ, `) and C ′ = (C ′, χ′, `′).
Then:
• (C, X)↔(C ′, X ′) implies (C, X) ≡ (C ′, X ′).
Let now, additionally, the sets of vertices of C and C ′ be finite. Then:
• (C, X) ≡ (C ′, X ′) implies (C, X)↔(C ′, X ′). a
Proof These proofs are elementary. Let us show the second item.
Define relation R : F(C) × F(C ′) as: for all X ∈ F(C) and X ′ ∈ F(C ′), RXX ′ if
(C, X) ≡ (C ′, X ′). We show that R is a bisimulation.
Let RXX ′ be arbitrary.
First consider condition atoms. For all pa ∈ P , pa ∈ `(X) iff pa ∈ `′(X ′), because
(C, X) ≡ (C ′, X ′) implies that (C, X) |= pa iff C ′, X ′ |= pa.
Now consider forth. Let Y ∈ F(C) be such that a ∈ χ(X ∩ Y ). Consider Y ′ :=
{Y ′ ∈ F(C ′) | a ∈ χ(X ′ ∩ Y ′)}. A C ′ is finite, Y ′ is finite, let Y ′ = {Y ′1 , . . . , Y ′n}. Now
suppose towards a contradiction that Y is not in the relation R with any of the Y ′1 , . . . , Y
′
n,
so that therefore (C, Y ) 6≡ (C ′, Y ′1), . . . , (C, Y ) 6≡ (C ′, Y ′1). Then there are ϕ1, . . . , ϕn such
that C ′, Y ′1 |= ϕ1 but C, Y 6|= ϕ1, . . . , C ′, Y ′n |= ϕn but C, Y 6|= ϕn. Using the semantics of
knowledge, it follows that C ′, X ′ |= Ka(ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn) whereas C, X 6|= Ka(ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn).
Therefore it is not the case that (C, X) ≡ (C ′, X ′). This contradicts the assumption RXX ′.
The condition back is shown similarly. 
Given complexes C and C ′, let f : V(C) → V(C ′) be a chromatic simplicial map. The
relation R ⊆ V(C)× V(C ′) defined as, for all x ∈ V(C) and x′ ∈ V(C ′), Rxy iff f(x) = y
is called the induced relation. Also, as R is functional, this, in its turn, induces a unique
relation R between facets (in the usual way). We recall that a simplicial map is value
preserving between simplicial models iff for all v ∈ V(C), `′(f(v)) = `(v) (where ` is the
valuation on C and `′ that on C ′). We now have that:
Proposition 13 The induced relation R of a value preserving chromatic simplicial map f
between simplicial models C and C ′ is a simulation. a
Proof The proof is elementary. 
As a direct consequence of Proposition 13, if both f and f−1 are value preserving chromatic
simplicial maps, then the induced relation R, that determines a unique relation between
facets as it is functional, is a bisimulation between C and C ′. This bisimulation is an
isomorphism.
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Covering complex As explained by Hatcher [30], algebraic topology can be roughly de-
fined as the study of techniques for forming algebraic images of topological spaces. Thus,
continuous maps between spaces are projected onto homomorphisms between their alge-
braic images, so topologically related spaces have algebraically related images. One of the
simplest and most important functors of algebraic topology, the fundamental group, which
creates an algebraic image of a space from the loops in the space (i.e., paths starting and
ending at the same point). The fundamental group of a space X is defined so that its
elements are loops in X starting and ending at a fixed basepoint x0 ∈ X , but two such
loops are regarded as determining the same element of the fundamental group if one loop
can be continuously deformed into the other within the space X . There is a very deep
connection between the fundamental group and covering spaces, and they can be regarded
as two viewpoints toward the same thing [54]. This means that algebraic features of the
fundamental group can often be translated into the geometric language of covering spaces.
Roughly speaking, a space Y is called a covering space of X if Y maps onto X in a locally
homeomorphic way, so that the pre-image of every point in X has the same cardinality.
We consider the combinatorial version of covering complex [54], extended to the epis-
temic setting. Let C = (C, χ, `) and C ′ = (C ′, χ′, `′) be simplicial models. An epistemic
covering complex of C ′ is a pair (C, f) where C is a connected complex and f : C → C ′ is
a value preserving simplical map such that for every simplex X in C ′, f−1(X) is a union
of pairwise disjoint simplices. We observe that C ′ is the image of f . Hence, C ′ is also
connected.
Applications of covering spaces to distributed computing are explored in [22], and this
is an example. In the figure we assume that a vertex v and f(v) have the same valuations,
and an edge in C is sent by f to the edge of the same label in C ′.
Proposition 14 If (C, f) is an epistemic covering complex of C ′ then there is a total
bisimulation between C and C ′. a
Proof By Proposition 13 the induced relation R of f : C → C ′ is a simulation from C
to C ′. It is easy to see that the back property holds as well. 
5 Local semantics for simplicial complexes
In [26] the semantics of knowledge on simplicial complexes employs a satisfaction relation
between a pair consisting of a simplicial model and a facet of that model, and a formula.
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However, in combinatorial topology we not only wish to determine what is true in a facet,
but also what is true in any simplex. We wish a more local semantics. There are two roads
towards such local semantics for simplicial complexes. There is another road from a local
semantics for simplices to the special case of facets.
5.1 From semantics for facets to semantics for simplices
Multi-pointed local semantics In the first place, just as in Kripke semantics, we
can define the satisfaction relation between multi-pointed simplicial models and formulas,
instead of between pointed simplicial complexes and formulas, using that for any face of
dimension m < n, there is a unique set of facets that contain it (we recall that we only
consider pure complexes).
A multi-pointed simplicial model (C,X ) is a pair consisting of a simplicial model C =
(C, χ, `) and a set X of facets X ∈ F(C). The satisfaction relation for such sets of facets
is easily defined in the obvious way.
C,X |= ϕ iff C, X |= ϕ for all X ∈X
Consequently, given any simplex Y ⊆ C of C, and the set X := {X ∈ F(C) | Y ⊆ X} of
facets containing it as a face, we can define the local truth in Y as follows.
C, Y |= ϕ iff C, X |= ϕ for all X ∈ F(C) with Y ⊆ X
Example 15 Consider the simplicial model depicted below, where, as before, for the con-
venience of the exposition the vertices have been labelled with the colour/agent i and the
value of the single local proposition pi for that agent, where 0 means that pi is false and 1
means that pi is true, and where as names of these vertices we use such pairs. Let further
X = {a0, c1, b1}, Y = {a1, c1, b1}, and Z = {a1, c1, b0} be the three facets of the complex,
as also suggestively depicted.
a0 b0
a1b1
c1
X Z
Y
We now have that C, X |= Ka¬pa, but C, {b1, c1} 6|= Ka¬pa. As {b1, c1} = X ∩ Y ,
C, {b1, c1} |= ϕ is equivalent to (C, X |= ϕ and C, Y |= ϕ). And from C, Y |= Kapa it
follows that C, Y 6|= Ka¬pa, and thus C, {b1, c1} 6|= Ka¬pa. The edge {b1, c1} represents
that agents b and c are uncertain about what a knows.
Similarly, in vertex c1, agent c, who there knows that pc, is uncertain between valuations
¬pa ∧ pb ∧ pc, pa ∧ pb ∧ pc, and pa ∧ ¬pb ∧ pc. This is described by C, c1 |= Kc((¬pa ∧ pb ∧
pc)∨ (pa∧pb∧pc)∨ (pa∧¬pb∧pc))∧ K̂c(¬pa∧pb∧pc)∧ K̂c(pa∧pb∧pc)∧ K̂c(pa∧¬pb∧pc).
In particular, from this it also follows that C, c1 |= Kc(pa ∨ pb). Although c considers it
possible that pa is false, and also considers it possible that pb is false, she does not consider
it possible that both are false. a
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Language-restricted local semantics There is also another, slightly more winding,
road to a local semantics for simplicial models. This involves restricting the language as
well: when interpreting a formula in a simplex, we then only allow knowledge modalities
and local variables for the colours of that simplex. Given the language LK(A,P ), where
P =
⋃
a∈A Pa, and given a simplicial model C = (C, χ, `) and a simplex X ∈ C, satisfaction
C, X |= ϕ is only defined for formulas ϕ in the language restricted to agents in χ(X) and
to local variables for those agents. In other words, we then only formalize what the agents
in χ(X) know and do not know about themselves and about their own local variables, and
not what they know about other agents or their local variables, or about what those other
agents know. (Similar restrictions abound in game theory and computational social choice
[12].) This comes with the following semantics.
The relation |= between a pair (C, X) and ϕ is defined for ϕ ∈ LK(χ(X), P |χ(X)),
where P |χ(X) := ⋃a∈χ(X) Pa, by induction on the structure of ϕ. The non-obvious two
clauses are as follows. The language restriction implies that, below, the a in pa and in Ka
must be in the set of colours χ(X).
C, X |= pa iff pa ∈ `(X)
C, X |= Kaϕ iff C, Y |= ϕ for all X ∈ C with χ(X) = χ(Y ) and a ∈ χ(X ∩ Y )
Instead of defining this syntactically, we can also define this semantically, as follows.
Let C = (C, χ, `) be a simplicial model for agents A, and A′ ⊆ A a subset of agents.
The restriction C|A′ of C to A′ is the simplicial model obtained from C by keeping only the
vertices coloured by A′, i.e., C|A′ = (C ′, χ′, `′) where C ′ = {X ∈ C | χ(X) ⊆ A′}, where
for all X ∈ C ′, χ′(X) = χ(X), and where for all pa ∈ Pa with a ∈ A′ and for all v ∈ V(C ′),
pa ∈ `′(v) iff pa ∈ `(v). We note that C ′ is again a pure chromatic simplicial complex and
that its dimension is |A′| − 1. The language restricted local semantics above is just the
regular semantics in C|A′, for formulas in the language LK(A′, P |A′). In other words, for
all ϕ ∈ LK(A′, P |A′):
C, X |= ϕ iff C|χ(X), X |= ϕ
Example 16 Reconsider Example 15. We now have that C, {b1, c1} |= Ka¬pa and C, c1 |=
Kc(pa ∨ pb) are undefined, because a /∈ χ({b1, c1}) = {b, c} respectively a /∈ χ({c1}), i.e.,
a 6= c. However, we have that C, {b1, c1} |= Kbpc ∧ ¬Kcpb and, less interestingly, as this is
‘all that c knows’, that C, c1 |= Kcpc. a
Let us write |=mp for the satisfaction relation in the ‘multi-pointed local semantics’ and
|=lr for that in the ‘language-restricted local semantics’. Then truth with respect to the
latter is preserved as truth with respect the former, which is desirable.
Proposition 17 Let ϕ ∈ LK(X). Then C, X |=lr ϕ iff C, X |=mp ϕ. a
Proof The proof is by induction on ϕ where the only relevant case is the one for knowledge:
Let us assume that C, X |=lr Kaϕ, i.e., for all Y ∈ C with χ(X) = χ(Y ) and a ∈
χ(X ∩ Y ), C, Y |=lr ϕ. We wish to prove that C, X |=mp Kaϕ. In order to prove that,
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using the |=mp semantics, assume that Z ∈ F(C) with X ⊆ Z, and, using the semantics
for knowledge, let V ∈ F(C) with a ∈ χ(Z∩V ). It then remains to show that C, V |=mp ϕ.
Let now Y ⊆ V with χ(Y ) = χ(X). Note that, as a ∈ χ(X), therefore also a ∈ χ(Y ).
From X ⊆ Z, Y ⊆ V , a ∈ χ(Z∩V ), a ∈ χ(X), and a ∈ χ(Y ) it follows that a ∈ χ(X ∩Y ).
From that, the initial assumption C, X |=lr Kaϕ and the |=lr semantics it now follows that
C, Y |=lr ϕ. By inductive hypothesis it now follows that C, Y |=mp ϕ, and from the |=mp
semantics and Y ⊆ V ∈ F(C) it then follows that C, V |=mp ϕ, as required.
Conversely, assume that C, X |=mp Kaϕ. Suppose that Y ∈ C with χ(X) = χ(Y ) and
a ∈ χ(X ∩ Y ). Let Z ∈ F(C) with X ⊆ Z, then from the assumption C, X |=mp Kaϕ
we obtain C, Z |=mp Kaϕ. Therefore, for all V ∈ F(C) with a ∈ χ(Z ∩ V ), C, V |=mp ϕ.
Similar to the reasoning in the other direction, for any Y ⊆ V with χ(Y ) = χ(X) and
a ∈ χ(Y ) we must have that a ∈ χ(X ∩ Y ), such that by definition of |=mp we obtain
C, Y |=mp ϕ, and with induction we can then conclude C, Y |=lp ϕ, as required. 
Local semantics for distributed epistemic models One can just as well consider
a similar local semantics for distributed epistemic models. Let M = (S,∼, L) be a dis-
tributed model for agents A and variables P =
⋃
a∈A Pa, so that states s ∈ S have shape
s = (sa0 , . . . , san). Given such s ∈ S, by s ⊆B s′ we mean that s is the restriction of s
to the agents B ⊆ A. For example, (sa1 , sa2) ⊆{a1,a2} (sa0 , sa1 , sa2). We now can, simi-
larly to above, either define, in multi-pointed fashion, that M, s|B |= ϕ iff (for all s′ ∈ S
with s′|B = s|B: M, s′ |= ϕ), or define, in restricted-language fashion, M, s|B |= ϕ by
induction on ϕ ∈ L(B,P |B). Again, truth in the latter is preserved as truth in the former.
5.2 A semantics for simplices including facets
A more rigorous departure from the semantics where the evaluation point is a facet are the
following alternative semantics for arbitrary simplices as evaluation points, of which the
case for facets is merely an instantiation.
Given are agents A and variables P =
⋃
a∈A Pa. Let C = (C, χ, `) be a simplicial model,
X ∈ C, and ϕ ∈ L(A,P ). Similar to before for facets, we extend the usage of ` to include
arbitrary simplices as: p ∈ `(X) iff there is a v ∈ X with p ∈ `(v).
C, X |= pa iff pa ∈ `(X)
C, X |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff C, X |= ϕ and C, X |= ψ
C, X |= ¬ϕ iff C, X 6|= ϕ
C, X |= Kaϕ iff a ∈ χ(X) and C, Y |= ϕ for all Y ∈ F(C) with a ∈ χ(X ∩ Y )
The special case of the knowledge semantics for vertices therefore is:
C, v |= Kaϕ iff a = χ(v) and C, Y |= ϕ for all Y ∈ F(C) with v ∈ Y
Elementary results corroborating this more general perspective of this semantics are:
Proposition 18 If C, X |= ϕ and Y ∈ C such that X ⊆ Y , then C, Y |= ϕ. a
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Proposition 19 If C, X |= ϕ, Y ∈ C such that Y ⊆ X and ϕ ∈ L(χ(Y )), then C, Y |= ϕ.a
Both are easily shown by induction on ϕ. Proposition 18 says, in other words, that if ϕ is
true in simplex X then it is true in the star of X.
6 From global to local epistemic models
Propositions 6 and 7 in Section 3 reported how epistemic models correspond to simplicial
models, however on the assumption that the epistemic models are local. We now investigate
when epistemic models that are not local can be transformed into local epistemic models
that contain the same information. It is easy to see that changing the domain or the
epistemic relations of an epistemic model can result in change of information content, so
that the only option is to adjust the valuation by replacing the global variables with local
variables.
Given epistemic modelM = (S,∼, L) for agents A and variables P we therefore wish to
construct a local epistemic modelM′ = (S,∼, L′) for agents A and variables P ′ containing
the same information, i.e., for all ϕ ∈ LK(A,P ) there is a ϕ′ ∈ LK(A,P ′) such that [[ϕ]]M =
[[ϕ′]]M′ , and for all ϕ′ ∈ LK(A,P ′) there is a ϕ ∈ LK(A,P ) such that [[ϕ]]M = [[ϕ′]]M′ .
In general, as known from [26], this quest cannot succeed. A simple counterexample is
the improper epistemic model
p
a
—— p
for one agent a and one variable p. Agent a cannot distinguish two states with different
valuations. Any local variable qa of agent a must be true in both states, as they are
indistinguishable for a:
qa
a
—— qa
This model collapses to the singleton
qa
We have lost information.
However, on other epistemic models this quest succeeds. For example, consider the
following (proper) model for two agents a, b and one variable p.
p
a
—— p
b
—— p
We note that p is not local for a and also not local for b. Now consider:
qaqb
a
—— qaqb
b
—— qaqb
for variables qa, qb. This model is local. As both models are finite and bisimulation minimal,
all subsets of the domain are obviously definable in both languages and can thus be made
to correspond. We can do this systematically for all formulas by, for example, replacing
all occurrences of p by (qa ∧ qb) ∨ (qa ∧ qb) in any formula in the language with p, and in
24
the other direction by simultaneously replacing all occurrences of qa by ¬Kap and of qb by
Kbp in the language with qa, qb.
In [41] the following method is proposed to make arbitrary finite epistemic models local.
Given M = (S,∼, L) for variables P , consider novel variables P ′ = {p[s]aa | s ∈ S, a ∈ A},
i.e., one for each equivalence class [s]a. Then, define L
′(s) = {p[s]aa ∈ P ′ | a ∈ A}. The
model (S,∼, L′) is local, and if M is proper, then ⋂a∈A[s]a = s, so that ∧a∈A p[s]aa is a
distinguishing formula for state s. Therefore, the denotation of p inM is the same as that
of
∨
p∈L(s)
∧
a∈A p
[s]a
a in M′ (see [41]). Dually, on bisimulation minimal epistemic models,
the denotation of any p
[s]a
a in M′ is the same as the of ∨t∈[s]a δt in M, in the original
language LK(P ). This solution is reminiscent of hybrid logic [9] wherein all states have
names, and in particular of the enrichment of models in symbolic model checking [58, 13].
This method may result in many more propositional variables. Also, on epistemic models
that are not bisimulation minimal, the model with variables p
[s]a
a is not bisimilar to the
initial model and then contains more information, as in the following example.
Example 20 Consider the three models below. The leftmost model is improper and the
other two are proper. The middle model (with names of states in between parentheses) is
proper but not bisimulation minimal. The rightmost model is obtained by having variables
correspond to equivalence classes. It is bisimulation minimal. For example, the formula
puva ∧ psub is only true in state u, but any formula in the middle model that is true in u is
also true in the bisimilar state t.
p(s) p(t)
p p
ab
p(s) p(t)
p(u) p(v)
a
a
b b
psta p
su
b p
st
a p
tv
b
puva p
su
b p
uv
a p
tv
b
a
a
b b
a
As said, we aim at a transformation that is information preserving in both directions.
Therefore, the method from [41] is not what we want. We therefore investigated alterna-
tive ways to make models local. Before we can report on that, we need to introduce an
additional technical tool: the distinguishing formula.
Distinguishing formulas Given a subset S ′ ⊆ S of the domain, a distinguishing formula
for S ′ is a formula in some logical language typically denoted δS′ , such that: for all s ∈ S ′,
M, s |= ϕ whereas for all s 6∈ S ′, M, s 6|= ϕ. A distinguishing formula for a singleton
S ′ = {s} is a distinguishing formula for s. If M is finite (a model is finite if its domain
is finite) and bisimulation minimal, a distinguishing formula always exists in LK(A,P ) for
any state. We can construct it as follows [60].
Let a finite epistemic model M = (S,∼, L) be given. Let us a call variable p ∈ P
redundant on M if, whenever M is a not singleton, p ∈ L(s) for all s ∈ S or p /∈ L(s) for
all s ∈ S (so the extension of p is S or ∅); and also if there is a q ∈ P with p 6= q and with
p ∈ L(s) iff q ∈ L(s) for all s ∈ S. On a finite model, there is only a finite set P (M) ⊆ P
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of non-redundant variables (even if P is countably infinite). Given s ∈ S, let τs be the
factual description of s, i.e., τs :=
∧{p ∈ P (M) | p ∈ L(s)} ∧∧{¬p ∈ P (M) | p /∈ L(s)},
and consider the following procedure:
δ0s := τs
δn+1s := τs ∧
∧
a∈A
∧
t∈[s]a K̂aδ
n
t ∧
∧
a∈AKa
∨
t∈[s]a δ
n
t
(1)
Consider the relation R defined by Rst if for all n ∈ N, M, t |= δns . If the model is finite,
the relation R is a bisimulation, and for all n ≥ |S|, δn+1s and δns have the same denotation.
We therefore take δ
|S|
s as distinguishing formula δs for state s.
References for distinguishing formulas in epistemic logic are [56, 60].
Distinguishing formulas with local variables Let us now adapt procedure (1) for
distinguishing formulas, using a novel set of local propositional variables. Firstly, write
τ[s]a for
∨
t∈[s]a τt. For each τ[s]a create a novel variable p
τ[s]a
a with the same denotation on
the given model. Note that this variable is local for a: Kap
τ[s]a
a is true iff p
τ[s]a
a is true.
Consider the following procedure:
δ0s :=
∧
a∈A p
τ[s]a
a
δn+1s :=
∧
a∈A p
τ[s]a
a ∧∧a∈A∧t∈[s]a K̂aδnt ∧∧a∈AKa∨t∈[s]a δnt (2)
The procedure is now in the language with local variables P ′ = {pτ[s]aa | s ∈ S, a ∈ A}. In
the sequel, in order to simplify notation, we may write ϕa for any propositional formula ϕ
equivalent to τ[s]a .
Example 21 Continuing the above example for three states, the following local model is
created. As p∨¬p is equivalent to >, we write >a instead of pp∨¬pa , etc., and we only depict
the valuations.
>apb a—— >a>b b—— pa>b
The resulting distinguishing formulas are
δ1s = >a ∧ pb
δ2t = >a ∧ >b
δ1u = pa ∧ >b
Also taking into account that agents know their local variables, an alternative description
is:
δ1s = pb
δ2t = K̂apb ∧ K̂bpa
δ1u = pa a
Recalling the relation defined as: Rst if for all n ∈ N, M, t |= δns , it is unclear if on
any given model it is a bisimulation with the new local variables if and only if it is a
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bisimulation with the old global variables. We conjecture that on finite models R is again
a bisimulation, thus achieving our aim to construct a local epistemic model with the same
information content as any given epistemic model. We further conjecture that on any given
epistemic model where R is a bisimulation but not so with the local variables, no local
epistemic model exists with the same information content. Example 22 demonstrates this
for an infinite model.
Example 22 Consider the following (image-finite) infinite chain M.
p
a
—— p
b
—— p
a
—— p
b
—— p
a
—— p
b
—— . . . .
Let us name the states 0, 1, . . . from left to right. The model M′ with local variables is:
>apb a—— >a>b b—— >a>b a—— >a>b b—— >a>b a—— >a>b b—— . . . .
State 0 is the unique state where Kb¬p. All finite subsets of the chain can be distinguished
by their relation to this endpoint, and therefore in particular all equivalence classes of
relations ∼a and ∼b, i.e., all local states of a and b. As an example, we show how three
local b-states and three local a-states are described in the language for the local variables
corresponding to booleans of the single variable p. For a local state consisting of states j
and k we write jk, etc.
eq. class distinguishing formula
01 K̂apb
23 K̂aK̂bK̂apb ∧ ¬K̂apb
45 K̂aK̂bK̂aK̂bK̂apb ∧ ¬K̂aK̂bK̂apb
0 pb
12 K̂bK̂apb ∧ ¬pb
34 K̂bK̂aK̂bK̂apb ∧ ¬K̂bK̂apb
The variable p is true in all odd states. However, this subset of the domain is not definable
in the language with local variables. In other words, there is a ϕ ∈ LK({a, b}, {p}, namely
ϕ = p, such that for all ϕ′ ∈ LK({a, b}, {pb,>a,>b}), [[ϕ]]M 6= [[ϕ′]]M′ . The models M and
M′ do not contain the same information. a
7 Group epistemic notions for simplicial complexes
7.1 Mutual, common, and distributed knowledge
Apart from individual knowledge, group knowledge plays an important role in epistemic
logic. There are three well-known kinds of group knowledge. In the first place, there is the
notion representing that everybody knows a proposition, also known as mutual knowledge
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[44, 20, 45].1 Then, there is the notion of common knowledge of a proposition, which entails
not merely that everybody knows it, but also that everybody knows that everybody knows
it, and so on [23, 42, 65]. Finally, the agents have distributed knowledge of a proposition if,
intuitively (but not technically), they can get to know it by communication [31, 27].2 This
notion is less well studied than the other two. This is somewhat surprising, particularly in
the context of distributed systems with communicating agents.
Syntax The notions of mutual, common, and distributed knowledge are formalized by
operators EB, CB, and DB, respectively. Mutual knowledge EBϕ, for B ⊆ A, is typi-
cally defined by abbreviation as
∧
a∈BKaϕ and only introduced as a primitive language
construct for investigations of succinctness and complexity. Whereas CBϕ and DBϕ need
to be additional inductive constructs in the logical language in order to be able to give
a semantics for these notions. Expression DBϕ stands for ‘the group of agents B have
distributed knowledge of ϕ,’ and expression CBϕ stands for ‘the group of agents B have
common knowledge of ϕ.’ Both common knowledge and distributed knowledge are known
to enlarge the expressivity of corresponding logics, although in different ways, and to han-
dle distributed knowledge we even need a stronger notion of bisimulation, that may serve
us surprisingly well for a generalization of simplicial complexes.
Semantics Given some epistemic model with relations ∼a for a ∈ A, we define ∼∩B :=⋂
a∈B ∼a, and ∼∗B := (
⋃
a∈B ∼a)∗, where B ⊆ A. Both these relations are also equivalence
relations. The semantics of common knowledge and of distributed knowledge on epistemic
models is now as follows.
M, s |= DBϕ iff M, t |= ϕ for all t with s ∼∩B t
M, s |= CBϕ iff M, t |= ϕ for all t with s ∼∗B t
It is straightforward to interpret distributed and common knowledge on simplicial models.
Let C = (C, χ, `) be a simplicial model (for A and P ), and let X ∈ F(C). To interpret
common knowledge CB, define operation ∗B for all B ⊆ A inductively as: for all X, Y, Z ∈
F(C), X ∈ ∗B(X), and if Y ∈ ∗B(X) and B ∩ χ(Z ∩ Y ) 6= ∅, then Z ∈ ∗B(X). Then:
C, X |= DBϕ iff C, Y |= ϕ for all Y ∈ F(C) such that B ⊆ χ(X ∩ Y )
C, X |= CBϕ iff C, Y |= ϕ for all Y ∈ ∗B(X)
Example 23 We recall the simplicial models C and C ′ from Example 9. We now evaluate
some propositions involving common and distributed knowledge.
1There is no agreement on terminology here. The notion that everybody knows ϕ (which is unambigu-
ous) is in different communities called: shared knowledge, mutual knowledge, general knowledge; where in
some communities some of these terms mean common knowledge instead, creating further confusion.
2The intuition puts one on the wrong foot for distributedly known ignorance: it may be distributed
knowledge between a and b that ‘p is true and b is ignorant of p’, but this cannot be made common
knowledge between them. If a were to inform b of this, they would then have common knowledge between
them of p, but they would not have common knowledge between them of ‘p is true en b does not know p’.
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• Let us investigate what a and b commonly know in facet F1 in C ′. To determine
common knowledge of a and b in F1, the commonly known proposition needs to
be true in all Fi bordering on edges of the ab-path: a0—b1—a1—b0, i.e., in all of
F1, F2, F3. In other words, it has to be (in this particular example) a model validity.
We now have that C ′, F1 |= Cab(Kcpc → (Ka¬pa ∨Kb¬pb)), as the formula bound by
Cab is true for all F1, F2, F3. However, C, F1 6|= Cab(Kcpc → (Ka¬pa ∨ Kb¬pb)), as
C, F4 6|= Kcpc → (Ka¬pa∨Kb¬pb). For another example, C, F1 6|= Cab(Ka¬pa∨Kb¬pb),
namely not in F2 where c knows ¬pc. And for yet another example we have that
C, F2 |= Kc(Kapa ∧ Kbpb) whereas C, F2 6|= Cab(Kapa ∧ Kbpb): in F2 agent c knows
more about Kapa ∧Kbpb than what agents a and b commonly know there.3
• In a facet of a simplicial model the agents all together always have distributed knowl-
edge of the valuation in that facet (or of anything else that is true on the facet). For
example, C, F4 |= Dabc(pa∧pb∧pc). On the other hand, C, F4 6|= Dac(pa∧pb∧pc), as a
and c are both uncertain about the value of b. Still their distributed knowledge in F4
(of positive formulas) is larger than that of each of them separately: the distributed
knowledge of a and c in F4 is what is true in F4, F3; whereas, what a knows in F4 is
what is true in F2, F4, F3, and what c knows in F4 is what is true in F1, F3, F4. a
7.2 Bisimulation for distributed knowledge
As such, distributed knowledge seems uninteresting on simplicial models, as in any facet
of a simplicial model the agents always have distributed knowledge of what is true in
that facet (although for proper subsets of all agents distributed knowledge may already
be slightly more interesting). Dually, in proper epistemic models, the intersection of all
relations is the identity relation (although, also dually, the relation ∼∩B for B 6= A need not
be the identity). Somewhat surprisingly, explorations concerning distributed knowledge
still seem of large interest to describe the information content of simplicial complexes.
The natural generalization of bisimulation including relations interpreting distributed
knowledge not only contains forth and back clauses for individual agents but now for any
group of agents [53, 1]. Given Rss′, we recall the forth clause:
• forth: for all a ∈ A, for all t with s ∼a t, there is a t′ with s′ ∼′a t′ such that Rtt′.
We now get:
• forth: for all B ⊆ A, for all t with s ∼∩B t, there is a t′ with s′ ∼′∩B t′ such that Rtt′.
This notion of bisimulation is stronger (for a given model it is a more refined relation) than
bisimulation for relations ∼a for individual agents only. See Example 24. This stronger
notion may be useful to elicit information from simplical sets, a generalization of simplicial
complexes, as illustrated in Example 25.
3Local semantics can also be given for distributed knowledge and for common knowledge. For example,
to determine what a and b commonly know on the edge {a0, b1} we need to consider facets bordering on
the chain a0—b1—a1—b0 only. For example, C, {a0, b1} |= Ka¬pa whereas C, {a0, b1} 6|= Cab¬pa.
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Example 24 The typical example where this stronger bisimulation makes a difference is
that it distinguishes the following epistemic models.
pp p p
p p
a
a
b b
ab
(x) (y)
In the top-right and bottom-left corner of the square model, agents a and b have distributed
knowledge of p; we note that ∼a ∩ ∼b is the identity relation. The two models are (stan-
dardly) bisimilar, but not with the additional clause for the group of agents {a, b}: in the
left one we can then go from a p to a ¬p state by a ∼∩ab link, but not in the right one, so
the forth clause fails for {a, b}. a
Example 25 (Distributed knowledge for simplicial sets) As the models in the pre-
vious example are not local, they do not correspond to a simplicial complex. And as the
disjunction of the values in indistinguishable states always is the uninformative value ‘true’,
there is no transformation to a local epistemic model (see Section 5). The only obvious
representation is simplicial model (i) below, where the name a01 suggestively stands for a
vertex coloured with a and valued with the indistinguishable set {¬p, p}. A similar quad-
rangular simplicial model represents that four-state epistemic model. But it is bisimilar
to (i).
Distributed knowledge may now be helpful. In model (y), the coalition {a, b} (for which
we will write ab) can distinguish all four states, we have that p→ Dab p and ¬p→ Dab¬p
are both true. Now consider adding this coalition as a third agent to model (y). Let us
call this model (y3). Then the model is proper, it is bisimilar to a two-state model that is
like (x) except that the third agent ab can distinguish the ¬p from the p state, let us call
that model (x3), and its corresponding simplicial model is (ii) below. Here, agent ab can
‘inform’ agents a and b of the value of p.
Clearly, any simplicial model for n colours/agents can similarly be enriched with addi-
tional colours for all subsets of agents to thus obtain a simplicial model for 2n − 1 agents
wherein all distributed knowledge has become explicit. Note that all epistemic models thus
become proper. It is tempting to model this in combinatorial topology with a generaliza-
tion of simplicial complexes to so-called simplicial sets, as suggested in [41, Section 3.7].
Just as a complex is a set of subsets of a set of vertices, a simplicial set is a multi-set of
its subsets, with the same restriction that it is closed under subsets (see e.g. [35], where
a simplicial set is called a pseudocomplex ). In (iii) and (iv) we tentatively depict (i) and
(ii) as simplicial sets.
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a01 b01 a01 b01a01 b01
ab0
ab1
a01 b01
ab0
ab1
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) a
7.3 Novel notions of group knowledge for simplicial complexes
Beyond applying the standard notions of group knowledge for epistemic models on simpli-
cial models, we can also consider novel notions of group knowledge for simplicial models,
for example, to express dimensional properties of complexes. Consider the following notion
in between common knowledge and distributed knowledge.
Let B ⊆ P(A). We extend the language with an inductive construct CBBϕ, for “it
is common distributed knowledge that ϕ (with respect to B).” Given epistemic model
M = (S,∼, L), let ∼∗∩B := (
⋃
B∈B ∼∩B)∗. This relation interprets operator CBBϕ as
follows.
M, s |= CDBϕ iff M, t |= ϕ for all t ∈ S with s ∼∗∩B t
Such a semantics has been proposed in [67]. But such ‘common distributed knowledge’
modalities can be equally well interpreted on simplicial models:
Let C = (C, χ, `) be a simplicial model. Define operation ∗B for all B ⊆ P(A) inductively
as: for all X, Y, Z ∈ F(C), X ∈ ∗B(X), and if Y ∈ ∗B(X) and there is B ∈ B with
B ⊆ χ(Z ∩ Y ), then Z ∈ ∗B(X). Then:
C, X |= CDBϕ iff C, Y |= ϕ for all Y ∈ F(C) such that Y ∈ ∗B(X)
Here, B can be any set of subsets of A. Of interest in combinatorial topology may be
subsets of agents of the same dimension, i.e., all subsets of colours/agents of size m < n.
Let us therefore define ∗m as a special case of the above ∗B namely such that: X ∈ ∗m(X),
and if Y ∈ ∗m(X) and there is B ⊆ A with |B| = m + 1 and B ⊆ χ(Z ∩ Y ), then
Z ∈ ∗m(X).4 We then get:
C, X |= CDmϕ iff C, Y |= ϕ for all Y ∈ F(C) such that Y ∈ ∗m(X)
Clearly, we have that CD0ϕ ↔ CAϕ. An interesting case to reason about simplicial
models of dimension n is CDn−1ϕ. This describes truth in a manifold (see Section 3.2):
if C, X |= CDn−1ϕ and C is a manifold, then ϕ should be true on the entire complex.
Otherwise, it is true on a certain subcomplex of C, namely on the restriction of C = (C, χ, `)
to the set of vertices v ∈ V(C) containing X that is a manifold. Clearly, for every m < n,
4The epistemic model equivalent would be: ∼∗∩m := (
⋃|B|=m+1
B⊆A ∼∩B)∗.
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CDmϕ describes truth on a similar subcomplex of C but where all facets intersect in
dimension m.
The modalities CDmϕ are a mere example. We can also consider modalities describing
truth on the boundary of a manifold. We can consider variations of so-called conditional
common knowledge [59] targetting features of simplicial complexes. And so on.
Example 26 Reconsider the simplicial model of Example 15, below on the left, call it C,
and consider as well a variant C ′ extending it, below on the right. We note that C is a
manifold, whereas C ′ is not. However, it is tempting to see C ′ as two manifolds intersecting
in the vertex named b0. Simplicial model C ′ represents agent b being uncertain between
two complexes with only difference the value of c, pc or ¬pc. With the operator CD1 we
can describe truth in the different regions of C ′. We recall that CD0 = CA. Some typical
truths in C and C ′ are:
• C, X |= Cabcpc: this is true as pc is true in facets X, Y, Z.
• C ′, X 6|= Cabcpc: this is false as, for example, C ′, V 6|= pc, and facets X and V are
connected via c ∈ χ(X ∩ Z) and b ∈ χ(Z ∩ V ).
• C ′, X |= CD1pc: this is true, as we only need to consider connectivity by a sequence
of facets intersecting in dimension 1. We note that |X ∩Y | = 1 and |Y ∩Z| = 1, and
that pc is true in X, Y and Z. Therefore C, X |= CD1pc.
• C ′, V |= CD1¬pc: in the other part of C ′, CD1 describes truth in facets V, U,W .
C: a0 b0
a1b1
c1
X Z
Y
C ′: a0 b0
a1b1
c1
X Z
Y
a0
b1a1
c0
V W
U
a
8 Belief for simplicial complexes
Apart from knowledge, another common notion in epistemic logics is that of belief. The
received convention is that, unlike knowledge, beliefs may be false, but that otherwise
belief has the properties of knowledge, including the property known as consistency. The
modality for belief is Ba. That beliefs may be false is embodied in the failure of the validity
Baϕ → ϕ. Instead, we have the ‘consistency’ axiom Baϕ → Bˆaϕ (that corresponds to
seriality of underlying frames). Like knowledge, belief should also satisfy the ‘introspection’
principles Baϕ→ BaBaϕ and ¬Baϕ→ Ba¬Baϕ.
More precisely, in the inductive language definition we can replace the inductive clause
Kaϕ, for ‘agent a knows ϕ’, with the inductive clause Baϕ, for ‘agent a believes ϕ’ (if we
were to have both, a more complex proposal is required).
The validity Kaϕ → ϕ for knowledge characterizes the reflexivity of the epistemic
models. With the weaker Baϕ → Bˆaϕ for belief the relations in epistemic models are
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no longer equivalence relations. A typical model wherein agent a incorrectly believes p is
M = (S,R, L) with S = {s, t}, R = {(s, t), (t, t)} and p ∈ L(t), often depicted as p a→ p
(this visualization uses the convention for belief that if an arrow points to a state, that state
implicitly has a reflexive arrow). However, this visualization is not relevant for modelling
belief on simplicial models.
See [36, 44, 62] for more information on belief.
Semantics of belief We now address the semantics of belief on simplicial models. Let
a simplicial model C = (C, χ, `) be given. For each agent a ∈ A, let fa be an idempotent
function between the a-coloured vertices of C, called belief function (a function f is idem-
potent iff for all x, f(f(x)) = f(x)). We emphasize that fa need not preserve variables: it
may well be that pa ∈ `(v) but pa /∈ `(fa(v)), or vice versa.
We recall the semantics of knowledge on simplicial models:
C, X |= Kaϕ iff C, X ′ |= ϕ for all X ′ with a ∈ χ(X ∩X ′)
Somewhat differently but equivalently formulated this is (we recall that Xa is the vertex
of facet X coloured a):
C, X |= Kaϕ iff C, X ′ |= ϕ for all X ′ with Xa ∈ X ′
The proposed semantics of belief is now as follows. It is surprisingly straightforward.
C, X |= Baϕ iff C, X ′ |= ϕ for all X ′ with fa(Xa) ∈ X ′
Proposition 27 (Properties of belief) The following are validities of the logic of belief
on simplicial complexes.
1. Baϕ→ Bˆaϕ (consistency)
2. Baϕ→ BaBaϕ (positive introspection)
3. Bˆaϕ→ BaBˆaϕ (negative introspection) a
Proof These properties are easily derived. The requirement that for all a ∈ A the belief
function fa is idempotent guarantees both introspection properties of belief.
• Belief is consistent, because fa is a (total) function and the simplicial complex is
pure, so that for any a-coloured vertex v, fa(v) must be contained in at least one
facet.
• To show positive introspection we use the contrapositive BˆaBˆa¬ϕ → Bˆa¬ϕ. Let
C, X |= BˆaBˆa¬ϕ, then there is a facet X ′ such that fa(Xa) ∈ X ′ and C, X ′ |= Bˆa¬ϕ.
Therefore, there are X ′, X ′′ such that: fa(Xa) ∈ X ′, fa(X ′a) ∈ X ′′, and C, X ′′ |= ¬ϕ.
As fa is idempotent and as X
′ obviously only contains a single vertex of colour a,
fa(X
′
a) = fa(fa(Xa)) = fa(Xa). Therefore, by the semantics of belief, C, X |= Bˆa¬ϕ.
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• Negative introspection is shown very similarly. Let C, X |= Bˆaϕ be given, i.e.,
there is a facet X ′ such that fa(Xa) ∈ X ′ and C, X ′ |= ϕ. We need to show that
C, X |= BaBˆaϕ. In order to show that, let X ′′ be such that fa(Xa) ∈ X ′′. Again, as
fa(fa(Xa)) = fa(Xa) we see that C, X ′′ |= Bˆaϕ, thus C, X |= BaBˆaϕ. 
A special case of belief is when agents correctly believe (and thus know) the value of their
local state but may only be incorrect about the beliefs or the variables of other agents. This
is guaranteed by requiring that for all pa ∈ Pa, and all vertices v, pa ∈ `(v) iff pa ∈ `(fa(v)).
We call such belief functions locally correct. It will be obvious that on a simplicial model
where belief functions are locally correct, Bapa → pa and Ba¬pa → ¬pa are valid.
Simplicial belief on epistemic models? The belief notion that we proposed on sim-
plicial models results in rather particular models in the Kripke model semantics. Take an
epistemic model (S,∼, L) and let for each agent a ∈ A belief function fa be an idempotent
function between the equivalence classes [s]a of a. Define relation Ra ⊆ S × S as: Rass′
iff there is a t ∈ f([s]a) with t ∼a s′. Then (S,R, L) is a model wherein all Ra are serial,
transitive, and Euclidean and thus interpret standard consistent belief (a.k.a. KD45 belief
[62]). In other words, the agent’s beliefs are uniform: the agent still believes to know her
local state, but in all indistinguishable global states she considers it possible that the global
states are those of another equivalence class, wherein her local state might be different.
Example 28 Consider again the simplicial model from Example 9 depicted below.
a0 b0
c0
a1b1
c1
F1
F2
F3
F4
We give three examples of idempotent simplicial functions, and the resulting consequences
for the beliefs of the agents:
1. fa defined as fa(a0) = a1 (and thus fa(a1) = a1).
2. fc defined as fc(c0) = c1 (and thus fc(c1) = c1).
3. f ′a defined as f
′
a(a1) = a0 (and thus f
′
a(a0) = a0), f
′
b(b1) = b0, and f
′
c(c1) = c0.
We now can, for example, validate the following statements:
1. C, F1 |= ¬pa ∧Bapa
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Agent a mistakenly believes that its local state is pa, whereas in fact it is
¬pa. For the verification of the belief component we note that C, F1 |= Bapa
iff C, F ′ |= pa for all F ′ containing fa(a0) = a1, which are F2, F3, F4 that
all obviously satisfy a1.
C, F1 |= (pb ∧ pc) ∧ Bˆa(pb ∧ pc) ∧ ¬Ba(pb ∧ pc)
The first conjunct is obvious, the second is because a1 ∈ F4, the last is
because a1 ∈ F2 and also because a1 ∈ F3, neither satisfy pb ∧ pc.
2. Similarly to the first item, we now have for example that C, F2 |= ¬pc ∧Bcpc.
3. C, F1 |= Ba(¬pa ∧ pb ∧ pc) ∧Bb(pa ∧ ¬pb ∧ pc) ∧Bc(pa ∧ pb ∧ ¬pc)
In F1, the beliefs of the agents are inconsistent, they all think to know
what the actual state of affairs (the designated facet) is, but their beliefs
are incompatible. In fact, for any facet, under this f ′ map, their beliefs
about the valuation are mistaken. Also, in any facet, all three agents
believe that they are certain (all agents only consider one facet possible).
In this example no belief function is locally correct. If we we were to change the value of
pa in vertex a1 into false, then fa and f
′
a would be locally correct. a
9 Simplicial action models
Action model logic is an extension of epistemic logic with operators modelling change of
information [6, 64]. Although we can, of course, strictly separate syntax and semantics, it
is common to see these operators as epistemic models wherein the valuations of atoms have
been replaced by formulas (in the logical language), that should be seen as executability
preconditions for the states in the epistemic model, that are therefore not called states but
actions. Instead of presenting action models (for which we refer to the above references)
we will present their simplicial equivalents, the simplicial action models introduced in [26].
We present them with a minor variation, namely with preconditions for vertices instead
of facets, and also including so-called factual change. We recall that we assume that all
simplicial complexes are chromatic pure simplicial complexes. This is also the case for
simplicial action models.
Simplicial action model A simplicial action model C is a quadruple (C, χ, pre, post)
where C is a simplicial complex, χ a chromatic map, pre : V(C)→ LK(A,P ) a precondition
function assigning to each vertex v ∈ V(C) a formula, and post : V(C) → P → LK(A,P )
a postcondition function assigning to each vertex and to each local variable for the colour
of that vertex a formula.5
5In logics that contains modalities for such action models, we need to require that V(C) is finite and
that post is a partial function defined for a finite subset P ′ ⊆ P only.
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If χ(v) = a, pre(v) = ϕ, and post(v)(p) = ψ this should be seen as agent a in v executing
the program “If ϕ then p := ψ.” Such assignments are simultaneous for all local variables.
Execution of a simplicial action model Let a simplicial model C = (C, χ, `) and a
simplicial action model C ′ = (C ′, χ′, pre′, post′) be given. The restricted product of C and
C ′ is the simplicial model C ⊗ C ′ = (C ′′, χ′′, `′′) where:
• C ′′ is the modal product (Cartesian product) C × C ′ restricted to all facets X ×X ′
such that C, X |= ∧v′∈X′ pre′(v′);6
• for all (v, v′) in the domain of C ′′, χ′′((v, v′)) = χ(v) (= χ′(v′));
• for all (v, v′) in the domain of C ′′ and for all p ∈ P , p ∈ `′′((v, v′)) iff p ∈ `(v).
In [26], simplicial action models have preconditions associated to facets. The definitions
are interchangeable: in one direction, for any facet X, pre(X) :=
∧
v∈X pre(v), as above,
and in the other direction, for any vertex v, pre(v) :=
∨
v∈X pre(X). Defining preconditions
on vertices has however some modelling advantages.
In the first place we can require, as a special case, all preconditions to be local, i.e., any
pre(v) for vertex v of colour a has shape Kaϕ (or, alternatively, any pre(v) is equivalent to
Kapre(v) on the simplicial model where the simplicial action model is executed). This would
be in accordance with distributed computing methodology, where all actions are sending
and receiving actions between agents. It rules out those enacted by the environment feeding
new information to the system. Most but not all simplicial action models in [26, 41] are
local in this sense. An exception are those for binary consensus [41, Ex. 3.48]. One could
even enforce commonly known preconditions, as in [28].
In the second place we can require, as an even more special case, all preconditions to
be in the language restricted to the agent colouring that vertex, i..e, any pre(v) for vertex
v of colour a is a formula ϕ ∈ LK({a}, Pa). As the value of all atoms pa is known by
a, and given the properties of Ka, this implies that preconditions are local. Again, most
simplicial action models in [26, 41] are even local in that more restricted sense (e.g., for
the immediate snapshot).
A more significant difference from [26] is that we also incorporate factual change (change
of the values of local variables) in our simplicial actions models, just as in dynamic epistemic
logic [59, 63]. We may need factual change to describe snapshot algorithms with write
actions, or binary consensus, of which we will give an example.
Example 29 Once more we consider the simplicial model C from Example 9, in which we
execute the action representing that a and b do not know the value of c. We can think of
this as a simplicial action model C ′ consisting of two facets intersecting in the edge {b, a},
with preconditions: pre(a′) = ¬(Kapc ∨Ka¬pc), pre(b′) = ¬(Kbpc ∨Kb¬pc), pre(c′0) = ¬pc,
pre(c′1) = pc. Below we depict that model and its execution.
6Using local semantics, instead of C, X |= ∧v′∈X′ pre′(v′) we can require that C, v |= pre′(v′) for all
v ∈ X and v′ ∈ X ′ with χ(v) = χ(v′). This may be more elegant.
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a0 b0
c0
a1b1
c1
F1
F2
F3
F4
⊗
c′0
a′b′
c′1
F ′1
F ′2
=
(c0, c′0)
(a1, a′)(b1, b′)
(c1, c′1)
We now have, for example, that after this action b still does not c’s value, but knows that c
now always knows his value: C⊗C ′, (F4, F ′2) |= ¬(Kbpc∨Kb¬pc)∧Kb(Kcpb∨Kc¬pb).7 We
have to choose a perspective of a pair of facets in the updated model in order to be able to
evaluate any formula. For example, C⊗C ′, (F4, F ′1) |= ¬pc whereas C⊗C ′, (F4, F ′2) |= pc.a
Example 30 As an example of factual change, consider the following action wherein agent
c publicly resets the value of her local variable to true, thus removing the initial uncertainty
for a and b about that value. The latter is depicted in C below.
The simplicial action model C ′ consists of a single facet, also depicted, with ver-
tices a, b, c, as usual reusing colours as names, with pre(a) = pre(b) = pre(c) = > and
post(c)(pc) = >. We may assume the postconditions for the other variables to be trivial,
i.e., post(a)(pa) = pa and post(c)(pb) = pb. The action c can be executed in both vertices
c0 and c1, where we note that in the resulting simplicial model C ⊗C ′ the valuation is such
that pc ∈ `′(c0, c) and pc ∈ `′(c1, c). Therefore, the two-faceted updated simplicial model
is bisimilar to the single-faceted one depicted to the right of it.
Note that a public assignment of pc to > is different from a public announcement that
pc (is true). This would result in the same updated simplicial model restriction, but as a
consequence of a restriction to the facet wherein pc is true.
c0
a1b1
c1
⊗
c
ab =
(c0, c)
(a1, a)(b1, b)
(c1, c)
↔
c1
a1b1
a
Example 31 (Simplicial action model for binary consensus) In binary consensus,
agents wish to agree on the value of a binary variable. We may assume that this variable is
an atomic proposition, and that each agent has a copy that is its local variable, that they
can communicate or manipulate while aiming to obtain consensus. Each agent a thus has
a variable 1a, where ¬1a is 0a, in order to reach consensus on 0 or 1. We assume that all
7If we were to incorporate modalities for simplicial action models into the logical language, we can also
express propositions such as ‘before the update c did not know the value of b’s variable, but afterwards
she knows’: C,F4 |= ¬(Kcpb ∨Kc¬pb) ∧ [C ′, F ′2](Kcpb ∨Kc¬pb).
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combinations of values are possible, but also that any kind of knowledge about the values
of other agents is possible, thus abstracting from the part of the consensus algorithm
obtaining such knowledge from other agents (e.g., possible knowledge gain modelled as
subdivisions). This has the advantage that we can focus on the simplicial action model
only.
Let there be two agents a, b with variables 1a, 1b. For both agents there are four
different actions, corresponding to four vertices. Consider a. If Ka(1a∧1b), then she leaves
the value unchanged (aiming for consensus on value 1), if Ka(0a ∧ 0b), she also leaves the
value unchanged (aiming for consensus on value 0). Otherwise, she considers it possible
that her value and that of b might be different. We note that ¬Ka(1a ∧ 1b)∧¬Ka(0a ∧ 0b)
implies K̂a(1a ∨ 1b) ∧ K̂a(0a ∨ 0b). In that case she non-deterministically resets her value
to 0 or to 1. This is an assignment 1a := > or 1a := ⊥ (i.e., reset to value 0). Agent a can
distinguish all these actions, whereas agent b cannot distinguish any of those. The four
actions of agent b are analogous, and cannot be distinguished by a.
The simplicial action model is therefore defined as C = (C, χ, pre, post) where V(C) =
{ui | i = a, b and u = w, x, y, z} and F(C) = {(ua, vb) | u, v = w, x, y, z}, and χ(ui) = i for
i = a, b and u = w, x, y, z. Then, for i = a, b:
pre(wi) = Ki(1a ∧ 1b)
pre(xi) = pre(ya) = ¬Ki(1a ∧ 1b) ∧ ¬Ki(0a ∧ 0b)
pre(zi) = Ki(0a ∧ 0b)
and
post(wi)(1i) = post(zi)(1i) = 1i
post(xi)(1i) = >
post(yi)(1i) = ⊥
The assignment post(zi)(1i) = 1i means that the value of 1i remains the same: if agent i
has a 1, it remains 1, and if she has a 0, it remains 0.
As is to be expected, unless a and b have common knowledge that the value is 1 or
common knowledge that the value is 0, they cannot obtain such common knowledge by
executing this simplicial action C: binary consensus is impossible. Even when they both
know that the values agree, for example when Ka(1a ∧ 1b) and Kb(1a ∧ 1b), they may still
consider it possible that the other does not know that, as when K̂a¬Kb(1a ∧ 1b), in which
case a considers it possible that b has reset its value to 0, such that consensus would be
lost. Although in fact, because Ka(1a ∧ 1b) and Kb(1a ∧ 1b), they both kept their 1s: there
is consensus. And so on, forever.
Validity and agreement are therefore not guaranteed by this simplicial action model.
Validity can be obtained for slight variations, for example when agents do not randomly
choose a value in case they consider it possible other agents have other values, as here, but
choose the value of the majority. Under that policy, then if all agents know all values and
there is a majority, validity is guaranteed.
Generalizing the case from 2 agents to n agents is straightforward. Instead of 2 ·
4 = 8 vertices we get 4n vertices: linear growth. Interestingly, the corresponding action
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model grows exponentially, as each action in the action model has a precondition that is
a conjunction of n parts, where each conjunct is one of these 4 options: 4n actions. The
distributed modelling is decidedly more elegant. a
10 Conclusion and further research
We have presented a survey of epistemic tools and techniques that can be used to model
knowledge and change of knowledge on simplicial complexes, which are a representation of
high-dimensional discrete topological spaces. Many of these notions bring in novel issues
in this topological setting. In future research we wish to apply these tools to model typical
distributed computing tasks and algorithms, beyond the situations studied in [25, 41, 26],
and to explore further epistemic horizons for these and other applications.
An interesting possibility of interaction emerges with algebraic topology, a very deep
and mature area of mathematics. For example, the well-known notion of consensus depends
on the connectivity of an epistemic frame and the related notion of common knowledge [27];
this is a 1-dimensional topological property. However, other notions of knowledge appear to
be related to higher-dimensional topological properties, and to forms of agreement weaker
than consensus [24].
With the exception of Example 5 modelling synchronous computation, we did not inves-
tigate impure complexes. Such complexes may well be interpreted in terms of unawareness
of local variables as in [19] (and as unawareness of agents). Special notions of bisimulation
would fit impure complexes.
As suggested in [41], distributed knowledge may be employed to describe simplicial sets,
the generalization of simplicial complexes to multi-sets (the pseudocomplexes of [35], with
a similar duality to graphs [11]). Then, we could have two facets that are indistinguishable
to all agents, aiming at removing the requirement that the epistemic model be proper.
It would also be interesting to consider infinite models. In distributed computing, in-
finitely many states and infinitely many agents (processes) have been considered in e.g. [2].
In modal logic, many tools and techniques apply just as well to the countably infinite
situation.
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